Kontra Daya’s pre-election report: Conditions for wholesale electoral

April 12, 2007

Kontra Daya is a broad-based election watchdog that was formed to expose a very likely repeat of the massive fraud that took place in the elections of 2004. One of our main concerns is to focus the people’s vigilance on the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Tasked by the Constitution with ensuring the integrity of the elections, the COMELEC itself is deeply implicated in large-scale electoral fraud, as revealed by the “Hello Garci” tapes and subsequent exposes. As the campaign period enters its final stretch, Kontra Daya hereby presents a preliminary report on its monitoring of the performance of COMELEC for the 2007 elections.

Kontra Daya will be using the events of 2004 as its yardstick in analyzing the probable conduct of election fraud for 2007. The electoral fraud perpetrated by the Arroyo administration to secure victory in the presidential and vice-presidential elections of 2004 consisted mainly of the following:

• fabrication of voting results in election returns to favor Gloria Macapagal Arroyo over Fernando Poe, Jr., largely in the provinces of Pampanga, Cebu, Iloilo, and Bohol;
• “dagdag-bawas” operations, i.e., the manipulation of election results in the certificates of canvass, perpetrated in a number of provinces in Mindanao;
• and a post-election “clean-up” operation in which up to 10,000 election returns were fabricated and switched for the authentic ERs kept at the Batasang Pambansa complex.

The key elements in the perpetration of massive and systematic electoral fraud in 2004 include:

• an extensive cheating machinery within and outside the COMELEC itself;
• inadequate control and security measures pertaining to the production of accountable election forms;
• the lack of opposition watchers at the municipal and higher levels of canvassing, which provided pro-administration election-riggers a free hand in switching or tampering with election documents;
• the utilization of certain units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) in creating favorable conditions for fraud to take place.

The integrity and credibility of the elections on May 14 requires that the COMELEC take the lead in investigating, exposing, prosecuting, and thus rendering ineffective, the extensive networks of election fixers that have proliferated within and outside the COMELEC; guaranteeing the security of ballots, election returns, and other accountable forms; and minimizing if not eliminating opportunities for cheating throughout the process of voting, counting, and canvassing of votes; ensuring the strict neutrality and non-interference of military and police forces in the election process.

Sad to say, the COMELEC has failed to plug the major loopholes that allow the conduct of massive electoral fraud. Kontra Daya thus makes the following observations:

1. COMELEC has abjectly failed to perform its Constitutionally-mandated duty to investigate and prosecute cases of electoral fraud in the May 2004 presidential election. Consequently, the “machinery for cheating” employed by the Arroyo administration in 2004 remains intact and primed for a repeat performance.

 

Article IX, Section 2.c.6 of the Constitution charges the COMELEC with the duty to “investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.” Up to this point, COMELEC has failed to investigate, much less prosecute, a single case of electoral fraud relating to the 2004 national elections in spite of the voluminous amounts of evidence and information made available to the public since then.

As a result, the extensive “machinery for cheating,” both within and outside the COMELEC, remains intact and available for highly probable acts of systematic and wholesale fraud in the coming elections.

A number of COMELEC personnel implicated in the massive dagdag-bawas operation in Mindanao in 2004 as revealed in the “Hello Garci” recordings have since been promoted, implying an increase in their capacity to unfairly influence, if not manipulate, the results of voting. These include:

1. Atty. Renato Magbutay, Region VI director,

2. Atty. Remlane Tambuang, Region XI director,

3. Atty. Michael Abbas, Region XII director,

4. Atty. Ray Sumalipao, ARMM director,

5. Atty. Lintang Bedol, Lanao del Sur provincial officer,

6. Atty. Francisco Pobe, Agusan del Sur provincial officer.

The sworn testimony of self-confessed vote-rigger Arsenio Rasalan revealed the role played by former COMELEC director and election lawyer Atty. Roque Bello in the fraud of 2004. According to Rasalan, Bello headed a complex operation to fabricate 10,000 ERs and replace them for the ones stored in the Batasang Pambansa. Bello has never been investigated; therefore, his extensive network of document and signature forgers are presumably intact.

2. COMELEC has failed to ensure the security of the production of election returns (ERs) and certificates of canvass (COCs).

Evidence from the 2004 elections shows that a number of private printers colluded with election riggers to produce spurious election forms such as ERs and COCs, using the same paper with the appropriate watermarks and security marks and following the lay-out and numbering of authentic election forms. These spurious forms, filled-up with fabricated figures and forged signatures, were switched with the authentic documents containing the actual votes of the people to alter the results of the elections.

In spite of public declarations made on several occasions by Chairman Benjamin Abalos that no private printers would be involved in the production of election forms, it has come to light that the COMELEC has allowed the National Printing Office (NPO) to make use of the very same private printer that was alleged to have been involved in the fraud of 2004, namely Grand C Graphics, Inc. to produce critical accountable forms such as election returns, statements of votes, and certificates of canvass for this year’s elections.

While the COMELEC continues to insist that all printing, even by private entities, is being done inside the premises of the NPO and that this is subjected to constant surveillance, we believe that the involvement of Grand C irredeemably compromises the security of the ERs and COCs that will be used for the May 14 elections. Grand C has access to the raw materials as well as first-hand knowledge of the design specifications, security markings and other control features of the critical election forms. Moreover, it has demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with election riggers in the past. COMELEC’s failure to prevent its participation in the production of accountable forms leaves the door wide open for the covert production of excess ERs and COCs for purposes of fraud.

3. COMELEC has so far failed to fully implement legally-mandated safeguards against wholesale electoral fraud such as “dagdag-bawas.”

We are alerting the public that up to this point, the COMELEC has been negligent and selective in implementing Sections 31 to 43 of R.A. 9369. This new election law, which includes amendments to B.P. 880, R.A. 6646, and R.A. 7166, introduces significant changes to the manner in which votes are counted at the precinct level and canvassed at the municipal and higher levels. These changes are intended to make counting and canvassing of votes more transparent to the public and thereby safeguard against wholesale forms of cheating such as “dagdag-bawas.” Notable reforms introduced include the requirement that the second copy of election returns and the third copy of certificates of canvass be posted for 48 hours on a wall within the premises of the precinct or canvassing center for the perusal of the public.

R.A. 9369 was signed into law on January 23, 2007. Yet on January 26, 2007, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7815, “General Instructions for the Boards of Election Inspectors on the Casting and Counting of Votes in Connection with the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections” which does not comply with the prescribed manner of counting of ballots provided for in Sections 31 to 36 of the new law. It was only on March 27 that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7843 amending its earlier resolution in order to make it comply with R.A. 9369.

In the meantime, the Department of Education produced a primer for the training of teachers who shall serve as Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs) (“Q & A Election Primer for Teachers”) based on the unamended COMELEC resolution. A large number of teachers nationwide have undergone training based on this flawed document. We are concerned that, unless teachers undergo retraining before May 14, COMELEC’s negligence in implementing the relevant sections of the new law will result in chaos and confusion at the precinct level on election day. Teachers may also be charged with election offenses if they fail to follow the new procedures mandated in R.A. 9369.

At this point, we have no way of verifying COMELEC compliance with R.A. 9369 with regard to the revised procedures for canvassing, as it has yet to issue its General Instructions for Boards of Canvassers. However, in a dialog with Kontra Daya on February 28, Chairman Abalos declared that they would not be able to implement Section 39 of R.A. 9369 due to “lack of funds.”

Section 39 prescribes the precise manner in which the Board of Canvassers shall conduct the canvassing of election documents, as follows: “In conducting the canvass of election returns or certificates of canvass, as the case may be, the board-of canvassers in a municipality, city, district or province shall project each election return or certificate of canvass on a wall from which its contents shall be read in order that those present in the canvassing center may follow the progress of the canvassing process from beginning to end. The Commission may utilize the appropriate projection equipment for this purpose.”

We believe that this is a key safeguard against “dagdag-bawas,” making the canvassing process more transparent and accessible to the public. Contrary to the COMELEC chairman’s declaration, it is clearly mandated by law and not merely optional or subject to the vagaries of availability of funding.

Should COMELEC fail to implement the relevant provisions of R.A. 9369, the conditions for widespread dagdag-bawas at the municipal and higher levels will continue to exist.

4. COMELEC is complicit with Malacañang in sabotaging the election for party-list.

The highly questionable pronouncements, decisions, and actions taken by COMELEC with regard to the party-list election calls into serious question the constitutionally-mandated independence of the poll body under the leadership of Chairman Abalos.

The threat of impeachment by the House of Representatives has given the congressional elections a life-and-death significance for Pres. Arroyo and her administration. To ensure its grip and preclude any possibility of a successful impeachment, Malacañang is determined to win an overwhelming majority of seats, including the seats for party-list groups in Congress.

For this reason, Malacañang has taken a special interest in the party-list election. On the one hand it has stepped up its campaign of physical attacks, harassment and vilification against militant party-list groups who are among the most vocal critics of the administration with the thinly-veiled objective of neutralizing them and preventing their meaningful participation in the upcoming elections. On the other hand, through its Office of External Affairs, it has fielded at least 22 party-list groups (based on information gathered by Kontra Daya) whose nominees are in one way or other connected with Malacañang. In so doing, the Palace seeks to do two things: one, gain control of more congressional seats via the party-list; two, with the sharp increase in the number of party-list groups in contention, make it more difficult for genuine party-lists to achieve the minimum number of votes required to gain a seat in Congress. Either way, Malacañang subverts and makes a mockery of the party-list law, which seeks to provide representation for marginalized groups in Congress.

For its part, the COMELEC has played along by accrediting a large number of party-list groups with dubious credentials and well-known links to Malacañang (see attached table.)

Most telling is its unprecedented and legally untenable declaration that it will not reveal the names of party-list nominees to the public until after the elections. In all previous elections for party-list, the COMELEC has never failed to provide the public with such information; its unexpected reversal of policy further fuels the suspicion that this supposedly constitutionally independent body is following the lead provided by Malacañang. By not informing the public who are the nominees of the party-lists it has accredited, especially the new and more suspect ones, the COMELEC is effectively shielding these shady party-lists from exposure and possible disqualification.

We likewise note COMELEC’s glaring inaction in the face of blatant electioneering by the Armed Forces of the Philippines against party-list groups such as Bayan Muna, whose leaders and members are subjected to harassment and intimidation by soldiers deployed in urban poor communities in Metro Manila, and targeted for extrajudicial execution in the provinces apparently by government-sponsored death squads. Eleven members of Bayan Muna and other progressive party-list groups have been killed since the start of the election period on January 14; a total of 128 have been assassinated since 2001.

 

Conclusion:

The COMELEC has so far abjectly failed to take effective measures to prevent a repeat of the systematic and wholesale fraud that marked the 2004 elections. This is likely to happen again unless drastic corrective steps are taken. The COMELEC is not just guilty of inaction and omission. It has become a willing instrument in laying the groundwork for electoral fraud and its subsequent cover-up. The COMELEC persists in undertaking and justifying grossly anomalous and highly questionable practices in the performance of its functions and duties.

With the very short time remaining before the May 14 elections, we issue this final challenge to the COMELEC to undertake the following urgent, if limited, measures:

• thorough investigation and reassignment to less critical positions of COMELEC regional directors and election officers implicated in the electoral fraud of 2004;
• suspension and thorough audit of the operations of private printers inside the NPO with the immediate and full public disclosure of the contracts or lease agreements entered into by NPO with these private printers;
• implemention of R.A. 9369, particularly Section 39 (projection of canvassing);
• order the withdrawal of AFP troops from urban areas, charge officers and enlisted personnel involved in electioneering, and immediately reassign military commanders in areas where extrajudicial killings take place;
• make public the list of nominees of party-list groups, revoke the accreditation of party-lists proven to be connected to the incumbent administration and/or government agencies, and put a stop to the harassment of legitimate party-lists and their nominees.

Our call:

We are not optimistic that the COMELEC will acknowledge its sins of omission and commission and take the necessary remedial measures.

We thus urge the public to prepare for the likelihood of a repeat of the massive electoral fraud that took place in 2004. This will likely happen before, during and after the May 14 elections.

We call on the political Opposition, poll watchdog formations such as the Catholic Church-organized Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) and other concerned citizens’ groups to likewise prepare for this eventuality.

This preliminary report will be made available to a host of foreign observers who will be coming to the Philippines to monitor the 2007 elections. It will also be made available to COMELEC-accredited and all other election watchdogs as well as the general public to alert them to the very real threat of massive, COMELEC-sanctioned cheating in the upcoming polls.

Kontra Daya will continue to expose election irregularities and anomalies as it calls on the people to remain ever vigilant and to stand ready to protect and defend their votes, through direct action if need be. #

 

 

 

1. AT (Aangat Tayo)	connected to PITC Usec. Teddie Elson Rivera
2. Abono	connected to House Speaker Jose De Venecia
3. Agbiag! Timpuyog Ilocano, Inc.	connected to Office of External Affairs Asec. Marcelo Farinas II
4. Aging Pinoy (Aging Pilipino Organization, Inc.)	connected to Norberto Gonzales
5. Ahon (Ahon Pinoy)	Dante “Klink” Ang II (1st nominee)
6. Ahonbayan	connected to Norberto Gonzales
7. APOI (Akbay Pinoy OFW-National, Inc.)	DILG Usec. Melchor Rosales (1st nominee), DILG NCR Dir. Rodolfo Feraren (2nd nominee)
8. AKSA (Aksyon Sambayanan)	connected to Norberto Gonzales
9. ANAD (Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy)	supported by the AFP
10. ANAK (Angat Ating Kabuhayan Pilipinas, Inc.)	Supt. Eduardo Octaviano, NCRPO-PNP (1st nominee)
11. ANC (Alliance of Neo-Conservatives)	Usec. for Presidential Appointments Liel Cordoba
12. Ang Kasangga	member, Sigaw ng Bayan
13. ARC (Alliance of Rural Concerns)	Archie Santiago (son of Sen. Miriam Santiago)
14. ATS (Alliance Transport Sector)	Ariel Lim, Presidential Assistant for Public Transport Affairs
15. ABA-AKO	Percy Chavez, chairperson, Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor
16. Babae Ka (Babae para sa Kaunlaran)	member, Sigaw ng Bayan; Sally Dagami (1st nominee), Ruth Vasquez (2nd nominee)
17. BANAT (Barangay Association for National Advancement of Transparency)	Raul Lambino (1st nominee)
18. Bantay	Ret. Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan (1st nominee)
19. Bigkis (Bigkis Pinoy Movement)	connected to PAGCOR Chair Ephraim Genuino
20. BP (Biyaheng Pinoy)	Dr. Arsenio Abalos, Jesus Cruz (vice-mayor of Mandaluyong)
21. Kalahi (Advocates for Overseas Filipinos)	Poe Gratela, former Office of External Affairs coordinator for OFW concerns (1st nominee)
22. VFP (Veterans Freedom Party)	supported by the AFP

 

 

 

Bayan Muna and other party-list group members killed since start of election period on Jan. 14, 2007

 

January 19	Prof. Jose Ma. Cui	Bayan Muna founding member, killed in Catarman
January 23	Ruben Ermino	Bayan Muna-Sorsogon
January 29	Dominador De Luna	Bayan Muna-Western Samar
February 8	Dalmacio Gandinao	Bayan Muna-Misamis Oriental provincial chair
February 15	Farly Alcantara	Kabataan-Camarines Norte
March 2	Renato Pacaide	Anakpawis Davao del Sur coordinator
March 2	Felisa Ocampo	Bayan Muna-Morong coordinator
March 10	Siche Bustamante-Gandinao	Bayan Muna-Misamis Oriental
March 11	Carlito Getrosa	Bayan Muna-North Cotabato
March 27	Arthur Orpilla	Anakpawis-Cagayan
March 27	Dionisio Battad	Anakpawis-Cagayan